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This box describes the key features of the most recent update 
to the Banco de España’s macroeconomic projections for the 
Spanish economy. In comparison with the previous ones 
published on 14 June,1 the current projections incorporate 
the new information that has become available since then, 
including the preliminary Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) 
estimates for 2021  Q2 and the changes in the technical 
assumptions underlying the performance of the different 
variables (see  Table A.1).2
The progress made over the year in vaccinating the 
population against COVID-19 has helped check the 
spread of infection and, above all, reduce the severity of 
the disease and, therefore, hospitalisation and mortality 
rates. This has enabled a gradual easing of the pandemic 
containment measures. As a result, since early spring 
economic activity has become more dynamic.
This translated into an increase in GDP of 2.8% in quarter-
on-quarter terms in Q2, following the decline of 0.4% in 
Q1. This dynamism which, in accordance with the pattern 
observed in the euro area overall, was notably more 
marked than was anticipated in the baseline scenario of 
the June projections, led to a narrowing of the gap 
between the current and the pre-pandemic GDP levels. In 
Q2 it stood at 6.8 percentage points (pp), still exceeding 
the corresponding gap for the euro area overall (which 
stood at 2.5 pp).
GDP growth in Q2 was underpinned by the strength of 
domestic demand and, in particular, of private 
consumption, which appears to have increased very 
substantially in quarter-on-quarter terms – by 6.5% –, well 
above the 2.9% rise considered in the June projections. 
Within this latter aggregate, there was a particularly 
marked increase in spending on services which, as they 
require closer social contact, benefitted from the easing 
of the pandemic containment measures. The end of the 
state of alert in May 2021 was a milestone in this respect. 
On the indicators available, economic activity appears to 
have remained highly dynamic in Q3. This has been 
achieved in a setting in which the ongoing lifting of 
restrictions was barely affected by the increased incidence 
of the pandemic up to the end of July. This is because, as 
indicated above, the health consequences have been less 
severe than in previous waves, owing to the vaccination 
progress.
Various data inform the view that economic growth has 
been high again in Q3, notably the data on changes in 
effective social security registrations (i.e. registrations 
excluding furloughed workers). In addition, the results of 
the latest edition of the Banco de España’s Business 
Activity Survey (EBAE, by its Spanish initials) show that 
firms perceive an improvement in their turnover for Q3 
similar to that perceived three months ago for Q2.3 
As in the spring, output growth seems to have been 
comparatively more pronounced in those services 
activities that are still further from their pre-pandemic 
activity levels. The improvement in branches of activity 
linked to tourism is particularly notable, driven essentially 
by demand from residents which in July exceeded the 
2019 figures. By contrast, the present situation continues 
to be less favourable for non-resident tourism, given that 
there are still some – albeit increasingly less stringent – 
restrictions in place on international travel. Despite these 
restrictions, the gradual recovery in inbound tourism has 
continued, although it is still well below its pre-pandemic 
levels. Specifically, inbound tourism spending in July was 
less than half that recorded in July 2019.4
Compared with these developments in the services 
sector, the recent performance of some industrial sectors 
– whose activity has been affected by the shortage of 
certain goods used in the production process, such as 
semiconductors and plastics – has been somewhat less 
favourable. These supply difficulties have begun to affect 
production processes in some key branches of Spanish 
industry (in particular, the car industry).5
Analysis of all the available data suggests that GDP 
growth in Q3 could be similar to that observed in Q2. 
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3	 	M.	 Izquierdo	(2021),	Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: septiembre de 2021,	Notas	Económicas,	Banco	de	
España.
4	 	See	Box	6,	“Recent developments in inbound tourism in Spain”.
5	 	See	Box	3,	“Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks”.
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Specifically, it is estimated that GDP may have risen by 
2.7% in quarter-on-quarter terms. However, the 
uncertainty surrounding this estimation is very high, since 
there are still relatively few quantitative data available for 
the summer months. There are also doubts regarding the 
size of the contribution to economic growth made by the 
projects linked to the Next Generation EU (NGEU) 
programme, given the limited information available in this 
respect.
Beyond the current quarter, the projections are based on 
the assumption that the epidemiological situation will 
continue to improve, in Spain and internationally. In 
particular, it is assumed that the proportion of the 
population that is vaccinated will continue to grow, with 
no significant new setbacks relating to the appearance of 
more contagious or more vaccine-resistant strains of the 
virus.
In this scenario, a further gradual normalisation of economic 
activity is expected, which will also be driven by other 
factors. These notably include the expansionary behaviour 
of imports in the developed economies, with which Spain 
has close trade relations, and the continued support for 
economic activity provided by demand policies, which will 
tend to limit the scarring the crisis may leave on the 
productive system (in terms of destruction of firms and 
higher structural unemployment). In particular, the ECB’s 
monetary policy will continue to provide important support 
for private agents’ spending through the maintenance of 
favourable financing conditions. In turn, the roll-out of the 
projects associated with the European NGEU programme 
will support the recovery in activity and will tend to boost 
the economy’s potential output.
All the above is expected to translate into continued GDP 
growth. It is estimated that the quarterly growth rates will 
be particularly pronounced in the period up to mid-2022, 
as this is when the increases in expenditure associated 
with the NGEU programme are expected to be highest.
On the demand side, GDP growth will be underpinned, 
especially in the short run, by domestic spending by 
resident agents. Private consumption is expected to 
continue to be a fundamental growth driver in the coming 
quarters, although as it gradually converges towards 
levels in accordance with its long-term determinants, its 
growth rate can be expected to moderate from the 
unexpectedly high levels recently observed. This is 
compatible with a gradual reduction in the household 
saving rate, which was very high throughout 2020 and in 
early 2021. Nevertheless, household saving is still 
expected to be somewhat above its pre-pandemic level in 
2023. Also projected is a notable increase in private 
productive investment, in a setting of recovery in demand 
and maintenance of favourable financing conditions and 
in which the projects associated with the NGEU 
programme will represent an important stimulus for this 
aggregate. Finally, net external demand is expected to 
make a positive contribution to output growth beyond the 
short term, largely associated with the gradual 
normalisation of cross-border tourism flows.
On the estimates made, GDP is expected to grow by 
6.3% in 2021 overall (see Chart 1 and Table 1). The strong 
dynamism of the economy since 2021 Q2 will give rise to 
a significant carry-over effect on the average rate of 
change of GDP in 2022.6 In consequence, GDP growth is 
also expected to be very high – 5.9% – in 2022, despite 
the significant moderation in growth rates expected 
throughout the year. Lastly, GDP is projected to grow by 
2% in 2023. As a result of all the above, it is estimated 
that GDP will recover its pre-pandemic level by mid-2022 
and that, by the end of the projection horizon, it will be 
2.5 pp above that level (see Chart 2).
These projections represent a slight upward revision of 
GDP growth of 0.1 pp in 2021 and 2022 and of 0.2 pp in 
2023. Comparing these projections with those presented 
in the baseline scenario in June, numerous factors of 
different signs converge, related to new historical data 
released, the revision of the short-term outlook and the 
changes made to the assumptions on which the 
projections are based.
The publication of the Q2 QNA data means, as compared 
with the June baseline scenario, that the starting point of 
the level of activity on which the current projections are 
based is more favourable, from the standpoint of the 
average annual growth rates in 2021 and 2022.7 By 
contrast, the short-term outlook of reduced dynamism as 
6	 	See	J.	González	Mínguez	and	C.	Martínez	Carrascal	(2019),	“The	relationship	between	average	annual	and	quarter-on-quarter	GDP	growth	rates:	
implications for projections and macroeconomic analysis”,	Analytical	Articles,	Economic Bulletin	3/2019,	Banco	de	España.	
7	 	In	accordance	with	the	INE’s	flash	estimates,	the	quarter-on-quarter	increase	in	GDP	in	Q2	was	0.6 pp	higher	than	that	projected	in	the	June	baseline	
scenario.
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compared with the June baseline scenario would lead, in 
the absence of other changes, to a downward revision of 
the projected GDP growth for this year and the next. 
Indeed, in comparison with the June projections, activity 
in H2 is, for several reasons, now expected to be 
somewhat less dynamic. First, the admittedly scant 
information available on implementation of the NGEU 
programme appears to indicate something of a delay in 
the execution of the expenditure relative to the schedule 
considered in the June projections (see Annex 1). Further, 
the sharp rise in private consumption in Q2 (significantly 
larger than projected in June) may mean this aggregate is 
converging more swiftly towards pre-pandemic levels. In 
addition, the growth outlook for consumption has also 
been adversely affected by the impact of the current 
upturn in inflation on real household income. Lastly, there 
have been signs that the recent intensification of strains 
associated with the scarcity of certain intermediate goods, 
which has been observed over the course of the year, has 
begun to adversely affect production in some key 
industrial sectors; moreover, these supply problems will 
foreseeably take months to disappear.
Regarding the changes to the external assumptions, as 
compared with those used for the baseline scenario of the 
June projections, their overall impact on GDP growth is 
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negative in 2021 and 2022 and positive in 2023, albeit 
relatively modest in all cases (see Annex 1).
Specifically, in the first two years of the projection horizon, 
the adverse impact on economic output stemming from 
higher prices of oil and other commodities and lower 
growth rates in export markets would more than offset the 
favourable impact of lower interest rates and the lower 
relative cost of domestic production relative to 
competitors. However, in 2023 these latter factors, 
together with the upward revision in the pace of the global 
market recovery, would drive growth higher than forecast 
three months ago. Further, the assumption that projects 
associated with the NGEU programme will be implemented 
with something of a lag vis-à-vis the June projections 
would entail a somewhat larger estimated growth impact 
in 2022 and 2023, at the expense of a lower impact in 
2021.
Developments in the main macroeconomic aggregates 
From the standpoint of the breakdown of aggregate 
demand, the projected recovery will rely mainly on the 
domestic component. However, beyond the short term 
the external sector is also expected to contribute positively 
to GDP growth.
All components of private domestic demand will rebound 
very sharply this year, following their marked declines in 
2020 (see Table  2 and Chart  3). Private consumption 
appears to have slowed significantly over the summer 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 14 September 2021.
b The rates of change for 2020 referring to the National Accounts series have been updated to include the review of Annual National Accounts for the 
years 2018-2020, published by the INE on 16 September. The new net lending/net borrowing figures for the nation and for general government will 
be published on 30 September.




6.13.91.80.35.018.54.11-5.9-noitamrof latipac dexif ssorG
3.45.99.115.41.117.82.02-1.02-secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE
4.33.86.113.35.75.118.51-2.51-secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
4.13.59.56.17.40.78.8-6.8-)htworg ot noitubirtnoc( dnamedDomestic 
4.05.03.04.02.17.0-0.2-2.2-)htworg ot noitubirtnoc( dnamed lanretxe teN
4.31.72.76.37.76.79.9-8.9-PDG lanimoN
6.13.10.16.18.12.11.11.1rotalfed PDG
2.12.19.13.17.11.23.0-3.0-)PCIH( secirp remusnoc fo xedni desinomraH
1.10.13.04.10.13.05.05.0doof dna ygrene gnidulcxe PCIH
8.14.57.67.16.51.84.01-6.01-)sruoh( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Annual average 15.5 15.5 15.1 14.3 13.3 15.6 14.7 13.7
Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) of the nation (% of GDP) — 1.1 0.1 3.1 3.4 1.5 3.1 3.1
General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) (% of GDP) — -11.0 -7.6 -4.3 -3.5 -8.2 -4.9 -4.3








PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2021  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(2021-2023)	(cont’d)
months, after the positive surprise of Q2, albeit maintaining 
notable momentum. The pace of growth in this aggregate 
is likely to diminish further in the final stretch of the year, 
as a consequence of the pressure on household income 
exerted by the current upturn in inflation. As a result, the 
recent decline in the saving rate is expected to continue in 
H2, which could see this variable drop from close to 15% 
in 2020 to around 7%, somewhat higher than the pre-
crisis level (see Chart 4).
The easing of consumption growth rates is set to extend 
into next year, owing to household spending gradually 
returning to normal levels. However, the dynamism of this 
aggregate will remain relatively high, despite the 
(foreseeably temporary) dampening effect of rising 
inflation. This against a background in which spending will 
remain underpinned by a sustained recovery in the labour 
market and, consequently, in disposable income, and 
financial conditions will continue to be favourable. In 
addition, the declining uncertainty regarding the health 
and economic situation will help reduce the precautionary 
component of saving. In any event, as discussed further 
on, there is considerable uncertainty as to the dynamism 
of this spending component, inasmuch as it is difficult to 
determine the proportion of the saving built up during the 
pandemic that households will put towards spending.
Among the components of gross capital formation, 
residential investment is expected to take on greater 
dynamism over the coming quarters. In that direction, the 
recovery in building permits reflected in the most recent 
information suggests higher growth in the execution of 
construction over the medium term. This positive outlook 
is fuelled also by declining uncertainty and favourable 
labour market developments, which have strengthened 
future household income expectations. Lastly, growth in 
this aggregate over the projection horizon will additionally 
benefit from implementation of the NGEU programme. 
Specifically, according to the Recovery, Transformation 
and Resilience Plan (RTRP), Spain will earmark a 
significant proportion of the grants it receives from the 
European Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to 
housing renovation.
In addition, investment by non-financial corporations will 
foreseeably be particularly buoyant over the projection 
horizon, owing to a combination of various factors. These 
include a recovery in final demand (leading to increased 
plant capacity utilisation), the gradual decline in 
uncertainty and the need, heightened by the pandemic, 
for digitalisation processes.
Further, corporate financing conditions will continue to be 
favourable, against a backdrop in which the ECB’s 
monetary policy stance is expected to remain 
expansionary, following the recent strategy review and the 
latest forward guidance on the path of interest rates and 
the duration of asset purchase programmes. Lastly, one 
factor that will particularly spur this component of 
aggregate demand is the implementation of projects 
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associated with the NGEU programme, which should 
result in high rates of business investment growth in 
2022  H1. As compared with the June projections, the 
current forecasts for growth in investment in capital goods 
represent a downward revision for 2021 and upward for 
2022 and 2023. These revisions owe precisely to the delay 
(according to the information available) in implementation 
of the NGEU programme; in these projections, this has 
resulted in part of the investment flow associated with the 
European funds shifting from 2021 to 2022 and 2023.
In any event, developments in private productive 
investment will foreseeably be uneven across sectors of 
activity, depending on the particular impact of the crisis 
on each and the potentially enduring changes in demand 
for different goods and services.
As regards trade with the rest of the world, the interruption 
of the movement of goods following the outbreak of the 
pandemic was largely temporary, limited primarily to the 
spring of 2020. By contrast, the prolonged duration of 
restrictions on the international movement of people is 
having a very lasting impact on tourist flows. Over the 
projection horizon, goods exports are expected to rise, 
particularly in 2021 and 2022, in step with the strengthening 
of activity in Spain’s main trading partners, which, broadly 
speaking, belong to the group of advanced economies, 
where vaccination rates are high (comparable with that of 
Spain). Likewise, headway in the vaccination campaigns 
in Spain and the main tourism generating markets is 
helping to sustain the recovery in exports of tourist 
services. However, it will still take some time for this 
aggregate to recover pre-pandemic levels. Imports are 
also expected to grow considerably, in keeping with the 
recovery in final demand. In any event, firms in some 
industries are facing supply difficulties for certain 
intermediate goods, leading to delays in the delivery of 
import orders in certain sectors that account for a large 
proportion of sales to the rest of the world, thus stifling 
both sides of foreign trade. This is particularly true of the 
automotive industry, whose exports represented 11% of 
the total in 2019 and 2020.
The degree of labour utilisation will move on an upward 
path, in step with developments in activity. Specifically, 
hours worked are projected to grow by 8.1% in 2021, 
before moderating to 5.6% and 1.7% in 2022 and 2023, 
respectively. Despite the slight increase in the labour 
force, this employment growth will keep the 
unemployment rate on a downward path throughout the 
projection horizon, falling below pre-pandemic levels 
from mid-2022.
The general government budget balance is expected to 
improve substantially over the projection horizon, after the 
acute deterioration in 2020. This reduction in the budget 
deficit will owe to the temporary nature of some of the 
discretionary measures adopted to contend with the 
fallout from the pandemic and to the cyclical improvement. 
However, the imbalance of public finances is set to remain 
at very high levels at the end of the projection horizon. As 
a result of these projected trajectories for the general 
government budget balance and for nominal GDP, the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio, which in 2020 surged to 
120%, would barely decline by 5  pp over the horizon 
considered.
Prices and costs
Underlying inflation, as measured by the HICP excluding 
energy and food, remained at very low levels, of around 
0%, in 2021 H1, largely as a result of the negative base 
effect derived from the decline recorded less than a year 
earlier in the prices of certain services – such as tourism 
and leisure – whose consumption had been especially 
hard hit by the pandemic. The disappearance of these 
base effects, together with the gradual recovery in 
demand for consumer goods and services, primarily in 
precisely those sectors most affected by the containment 
measures, caused underlying inflation to increase in the 
summer, to 0.6% in August.
The rise in inflation is notably more marked in terms of the 
headline HICP. The upward trend in this indicator mainly 
reflects the energy component, which was strongly 
affected not only by the base effects of the slump in oil 
prices during the initial stage of the pandemic, but also by 
the subsequent increase in oil prices, and by the surge in 
electricity prices. The rising electricity prices are explained, 
above all, by the impact of the increase in the price of gas 
and, to a lesser extent, of CO2 emission allowances on 
the prices set in the wholesale market.8
8	 	See	Pacce,	Sánchez	and	Suárez-Varela	(2021),	“Recent developments in Spanish retail electricity prices: the role played by the cost of CO2 emission 
allowances and higher gas prices”,	Occasional	Paper	No	2120,	Banco	de	España.
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In principle, these energy price rises are likely explained 
by predominantly transitory factors, relating to certain 
difficulties in the supply of some raw materials, which are 
especially important in the gas market, and the sharp 
increase in global demand following the re-opening of 
economies after the most stringent pandemic containment 
measures had been lifted. In any event, these energy price 
rises not only have a direct impact on the cost of the 
household consumption basket, but also represent an 
increase in firms’ production costs, in addition to the 
increase stemming from diverse commodity price rises.9 
Historical evidence points to a limited pass-through of 
these cost increases to final product prices, but depending 
on the degree of persistence of the increases, an 
eventually greater pass-through cannot be ruled out.
For these projections it was assumed that both these 
effects and those that will arise if workers incorporate the 
recent rise in inflation into their wage demands (known in 
the literature as second-round effects) will be limited, so 
that the recent increases in the price of energy, and of 
commodities in general, will only have a temporary effect 
on consumer price inflation.
In these circumstances, the pressure exerted on headline 
HICP by the factors mentioned above will peak in 2021 
Q3, their impact on inflation progressively declining 
thereafter. In parallel, the gradual decline in the degree of 
cyclical slack will prompt a modest sustained increase in 
underlying inflation over the projection horizon. In 2022 as 
a whole, the slowdown in energy prices is expected to 
comfortably offset the increase in the prices of services 
and non-energy industrial goods, so that headline HICP 
will moderate, from 2.1% in 2021 to 1.7% in 2022 (see 
Chart 6). In 2023, it is expected to fall further (to 1.3%), 
reflecting the behaviour of non-energy components. 
Underlying inflation, despite its expected increase, is 
projected to remain at moderate levels throughout the 
projection horizon and to stand at 1.4% on average in 
2023.
The sources of uncertainty surrounding the baseline 
scenario and the risk analysis 
Since the start of the pandemic, the Banco de España has 
chosen – given the heightened uncertainty surrounding 
the epidemiological and macroeconomic outlooks – to 
publish alternative scenarios that differ in various 
dimensions, including notably the assumptions regarding 
the course of the health crisis and the measures introduced 
to fight it. The immunisation progress in Spain and the 
other European economies has allayed the uncertainties 
of a purely epidemiological nature. Although these 
uncertainties have not been fully dispelled, their significant 
reduction has prompted the decision to present a single 
scenario, which is assigned a significantly higher 
probability of materialisation than the baseline ones 
included in the sets of scenarios published by the Banco 
de España in previous quarters.
These projections are based on the assumption that the 
immunisation of the population and the continued 
effectiveness of the vaccines will ensure that the impact 
of the pandemic on economic activity will continue to 
moderate in the coming months, until it becomes 
practically unnecessary to keep containment measures in 
place. That said, more adverse epidemiological 
developments than those assumed in the current 
projections cannot be entirely ruled out. These would 
involve more serious bouts of infection, linked to a 
potential spread of variants of the virus that are more 
infectious and, in the worst-case scenario, vaccine-
resistant, that would require the reintroduction of 
containment measures.
Also, as in the June scenarios, there is notable uncertainty 
regarding household spending decisions, which affect 
two components of demand. First, as regards private 
consumption, households accumulated a large stock of 
savings during the pandemic, as a consequence of the 
restrictions on certain types of spending entailed by the 
containment measures and more cautious behaviour on 
the part of these agents. For these projections it is 
assumed that households will resort to only part of this 
large volume of accumulated savings to finance current 
spending.
There are various reasons for making this assumption. 
First, a significant part of the spending that has not been 
possible since the start of the pandemic owing to the 
restrictions in place is not easily postponed; it related 
mainly to services such as dining and leisure and it is 
unlikely that the amount not spent during the health crisis 
9	 	See	Box	7,	“The factors underlying the recent increase in inflation in Spain”.
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can be fully added on to the regular spending on these 
items. Second, the households that have most reduced 
their consumption (or most increased their saving) with 
respect to the pre-pandemic period have been those with 
the highest incomes, whose propensity to consume is 
normally lower (see Chart 5). Lastly, although the evidence 
available on the existence of this channel is not conclusive, 
it is often argued that households, anticipating that the 
high volume of government debt built up during the crisis 
will lead to future tax increases, may decide to limit their 
spending.
Taking these arguments into account, it is assumed that 
households will not use more than part of the resources 
accumulated during the pandemic to finance consumption; 
thus, although the saving rate will decline over the 
projection horizon, it will still stand, on average, at 
somewhat above its pre-crisis level in 2023. However, the 
possible transfer of a larger proportion of these savings to 
consumption is an upside risk for the growth projections.
The second demand component which continues to be 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty as a result of the 
behaviour of households (in this case, non-resident ones) 
is tourism exports. Under the current projections, although 
inbound tourism flows will follow a recovery path over the 
projection horizon, they will not come close to their normal 
levels until 2022, and will not regain their pre-crisis levels 
until the end of 2023. Since the projections incorporate 
the assumption that restrictions on activity will have 
become unnecessary by around the beginning of 2022, it 
is possible that the consequent reduction in uncertainty 
may lead to a more rapid recovery in holiday travel.10
There is also considerable uncertainty about the scarring 
of the economy caused by the health crisis that will remain 
once it has been resolved. The projections presented 
assume that the policies deployed since the start of the 
crisis will, on aggregate, ensure that the damage it has 
caused to the productive system and employment, 
through the destruction of firms and the increase in long-
term unemployment, will have a relatively limited effect on 
the economy. These expectations are in line with the 
gradual correction expected over the projection horizon in 
the proportion of vulnerable companies,11 which has risen 
as a result of the pandemic.
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HOUSEHOLD. BREAKDOWN BY SPENDING ITEM
10	 	In	the	case	of	business	travel,	however,	it	is	likely	that	the	pandemic	will	cause	more	persistent	changes	of	habit.
11	 	See	the	results	of	the	simulations	presented	in	R.	Blanco,	S.	Mayordomo,	A.	Menéndez	and	M.	Mulino	(2021),	Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on 
Spanish firms’ financial vulnerability,	Occasional	Paper	No	2119,	Banco	de	España.
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In fact, the dynamism with which the economy is reacting to 
the lifting of restrictions seems to confirm that the magnitude 
of the persistent damage to the productive system caused 
by the crisis is relatively modest. That said, it is still early to 
assess the likelihood of more lasting scarring.
Moreover, various aspects of the NGEU programme 
implementation are sources of uncertainty for economic 
activity. On one hand, the current projections incorporate, 
as already mentioned, on the basis of the information 
available, a somewhat longer delay in the implementation 
of these projects than was anticipated three months ago. 
However, the timing of the spending is still very uncertain. 
On the other hand, the size of the multiplier effect on 
activity is, in practice, specific to each individual project, 
so that the aggregate elasticities used for the projections 
only give an imperfect approximation of the actual effect.
Also, in the preparation of the projections, the impact on 
aggregate activity of the disruption to global supply chains 
for some materials was considered to be temporary and 
relatively limited. However, should these supply problems 
prove to be more persistent, the possibility that more 
severe production limitations in the hardest-hit sectors 
(and, thus, lower domestic sales and exports) weigh on 
the recovery cannot be ruled out.
Lastly, in the emerging market economies, where there 
has been comparatively less vaccination progress than in 
the advanced countries, a possible intensification of the 
recent outbreaks of the disease and of the restrictions 
imposed to contain them would hit activity in these 
economies, with consequent negative effects on Spanish 
exports.
The net result of this multiplicity of risks of both signs is 
considered balanced for the projections of the economy’s 
output growth.
Consumer prices are currently subject to a much higher 
degree of uncertainty than they have been in recent years, 
since the present rise in inflationary pressures could be 
more persistent than has been assumed in these 
projections. Whether this eventually happens will depend, 
first, on whether commodity prices show greater upward 
inertia than is reflected in the assumptions incorporated in 
the projection exercise and, second, on whether the pass-
through to final prices and wages of the increases already 
observed in these prices is greater than that considered in 
these projections, which, as already mentioned, is based 
on historically observed empirical regularities.
The transmission of the increases in the prices of some 
inputs to final prices could be greater than in the past if 
the recent supply problems in certain industries persist. 
The assumption that the transmission of the pick-up in 
inflation to wage growth will be limited is based on the 
multi-year nature of collective bargaining (which means 
that inflation developments in a particular period can only 
influence wage settlements in approximately one third of 
agreements) and the limited presence of indexation 
clauses. In contrast, the more or less formal indexation 
mechanisms that exist for public sector pensions and 




The construction of projections is conditional upon the 
hypothetical fulfilment of certain assumptions about the 
trajectory of a set of variables relating to the Spanish 
economy’s external markets for goods and services, 
prices in the financial and commodities markets, and 
fiscal policy. The assumptions regarding Spain’s export 
markets and competitors’ prices in domestic currencies 
were taken from the “ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, September 2021”, which 
use information up to 16 August. For 2021, current 
projected growth for Spain’s export markets is now 
slightly higher than in June. However, this revision in terms 
of annual average reflects a more positive performance in 
the most recent period than what was projected three 
months ago. Conversely, prospects for the second half of 
the year have now become slightly less favourable. For 
2022-2023 there are few changes in the external demand 
outlook for goods and services produced in Spain.
The assumptions regarding the paths of interest rates, 
exchange rates, and oil and other commodity prices are 
based on the average prices observed in the respective 
markets in the ten working days prior to the cut-off date 
for each projection year (in this case, 14 September). In 
the specific case of exchange rates, the assumption used 
for the entire 2021-2023 period is the spot market rate. 
For the other variables, the values observed in the futures 
markets at any time over the projection horizon are 
considered.
Broadly speaking, compared with the June projections, 
the changes in these assumptions are relatively slight. Oil 
prices on spot markets have risen in recent months. 
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Based on futures market prices for the rest of the year, the 
average of this variable in 2021 would now be $68.7 per 
barrel, an upward revision to the June assumption of 
2.9%. Futures markets also indicate that oil prices will 
decline moderately to $65.3 in 2023 (a level 3.4% higher 
than in the June projections exercise). 
Yields on securities traded on 10-year sovereign bond 
markets prior to the cut-off date for these projections are 
now lower than in June for the three-year projection 
horizon. Specifically, this variable would stand, on 
average, at 0.3%, 0.5% and 0.7% in 2021, 2022 and 
2023, respectively. The slightly upward path projected by 
the financial markets for short-term interest rates has also 
been revised, although less markedly. Specifically, the 
3-month Euribor would increase from -0.5% in 2021 to 
-0.4% in 2023. The euro exchange rate has depreciated 
slightly in the last three months on the spot markets, 
somewhat more markedly against the dollar than in 
nominal effective terms. 
These changes in the external assumptions, compared 
with those used in June, are relatively small, and the signs 
of their effects on activity and prices do not always go in 
the same direction; accordingly, their impact on the 
projections is, overall, limited. Also, explicit assumptions 
on electricity prices have been used in these projections, 
since the scale of their recent increase has implications of 
some significance for the macroeconomic outlook. 
Specifically, the assumptions prepared have taken into 
consideration prices on the futures wholesale markets 
until end-2022. Since there is less information on market 
prices at different points in time for 2023, a relatively 
neutral assumption, based on month-on-month price 
increases equal to the average observed in recent years, 
has been used. 
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 14 September 2021. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated 
on the basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for export markets, in levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, in percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and in percentage points for interest rates.
c The assumptions regarding the behaviour of Spain's export markets presented in the table are obtained from the September 2021 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
d A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
e For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023
International environment
3.00.07.07.34.63.99.01-)c( stekram stropxe s'niapS     
4.36.49.23.561.967.863.24 )level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO     
Monetary and financial conditions
30.0-30.0-10.0-81.181.191.141.1 )level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
117.8 121.5 120.8 120.8 -1.2 -2.2 -2.2
    Short-term interest rates 
    (3-month Euribor) (e) -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1
0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
    Long-term interest rates
    (10-year Spanish government bond yield) (e)
Difference between the current
projections and those under 
the June 2021 baseline 
scenario (b)
     Nominal effective exchange rate against the non-euro area (d)
    (2000 = 100)
September 2021 projections
Table A.1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
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Lastly, the fiscal policy assumptions include several 
measures approved since the June projections. First, the 
different actions aiming to moderate the above-mentioned 
electricity price hike have been included. These measures 
were adopted at two different points in time.12 Second, 
the mechanism for offsetting the loss of pension 
purchasing power, reflected in the Draft Law currently 
before Parliament, has been introduced. This postpones 
to 2022 the expected budgetary impact of such offsetting 
owing to the rise in inflation observed this year.13 Lastly, 
the current projections include an additional extension of 
the furlough schemes to 31 December. This is pending 
approval, but is supported by the different social agents.14 
An additional source of changes in the fiscal outlook for 
this year relates to budget outturn which, according to the 
data published by the National Audit Office (IGAE), has 
improved relative to the June projections.
Additionally, the fiscal projections incorporate the final 
approval by Ecofin on 13 July 2021 of the Spanish 
Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (RTRP). 
The detail of the Plan includes the projected payment 
amounts and dates, and the milestones and objectives 
which these disbursements are conditional upon. 
The most recent information available suggests that the 
absorption of RTRP funds appears to have been relatively 
modest to date. This, together with the common delays 
between the approval of procurement tenders and the 
actual expenditure, points to the need to revise the 
absorption schedule; accordingly, it is now assumed that 
part of the absorption takes place slightly later. Specifically, 
spending included in the projections for 2021 would have 
an expected impact on GDP this year of 0.6 pp, 0.4 pp less 
than that considered in the previous projections. The 
estimated effects on the economy’s output over the rest of 
the projection horizon would increase by the same amount. 
In addition, based on the latest information available, the 
assumption that spending funded by the REACT-EU15 
programme is deficit-neutral year to year has been dropped. 
Specifically, such spending would have a moderate 
amplifying effect on the deficit in the short term, which 
would be offset by an effect of the opposite sign from 2023.
Aside from the assumptions regarding European funds, 
the forecasts for the period 2022-2023 are based on the 
usual technical assumptions. In particular, it is assumed 
that items subject to greater discretionality – such as 
public investment and procurement, given their volume – 
will grow in line with the growth potential of the Spanish 
economy. Also, in the absence of specific measures, the 
trajectory of the remaining items of the general government 
accounts is assumed to be governed by their usual 
determinants.16 
Based on the changes in the various budgetary variables, 
which are the result of the related assumptions prepared, 
together with the output gap estimated in a manner 
consistent with the other macroeconomic projections, it is 
possible to estimate the fiscal policy stance, measured as 
the change in the primary structural balance, net of 
European funds.17 According to this procedure, the fiscal 
policy stance, as occurred in 2020, is expected to be 
notably expansionary in 2021 and 2022 (1.3 pp and 1.5 pp 
of GDP, respectively). However, it would become 
contractionary in 2023 (by 0.6  pp) as a result of the 
estimated reduction of the stimulus from the European 






13	 	Draft	Law	on	 the	guarantee	of	pension	purchasing	power	and	other	measures	 to	strengthen	 the	financial	and	social	sustainability	of	 the	public	
pension	system,	indexing	each	year’s	pension	rises	to	the	inflation	recorded	during	the	12	months	prior	to	December	of	the	previous	year.
14  The information available points to the possibility of a further extension to 31 January 2022.









BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2021  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(2021-2023)	(cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Figure 1 
SYNTHESIS OF THE MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY, 2021-2023
MAIN REASONS FOR THE REVISION 
(compared with the June baseline scenario)
— Strong growth in activity in Q2 (+2.8 % q-o-q), especially in 
private consumption
— The latest information available also points to a high level of 
dynamism in Q3 (+2.7 % q-o-q)
— The use of part of the NGEU funds has been shifted from 2021 
to 2022-2023
— Recent significant rises in energy prices and the prices of 
some services












MAIN SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY
 
— The global environment and the course of the pandemic
— Private consumption dynamism going forward (rate of use of 
stock of savings accumulated and possible adverse effects 
of uptick in inflation on real household income)
— Persistence and/or intensification of bottlenecks
— Indirect and second-round effects that could mean the 
current inflationary path may last longer
6.3% 5.9% 2%
0.1 pp 0.1 pp 0.2 pp
2.1% 1.7% 1.3%
0.2 pp 0.1 pp0.5 pp
